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Self-synchronized Encryption for Physical 
Layer in 10Gbps Optical Links 
Adrián Pérez-Resa, Miguel Garcia-Bosque, Carlos Sánchez-Azqueta, and Santiago Celma 
Abstract— in this work a new self-synchronized encryption method for 10 Gigabit optical links is proposed and developed. 
Necessary modifications to introduce this kind of encryption in physical layers based on 64b/66b encoding, such as 10GBase-R, 
have been considered. The proposed scheme encrypts directly the 64b/66b blocks by using a symmetric stream cipher based on 
an FPE (Format Preserving Encryption) block cipher operating in PSCFB (Pipelined Statistical Cipher Feedback) mode. One of 
the main novelties in this paper is the security analysis done for this mode. For the first time, an expression for the IND-CPA 
(Indistinguishability under Chosen-Plaintext Attack) advantage of any adversary over this scheme has been derived. Moreover, it 
has been concluded that this mode can be considered secure in the same way of traditional modes are. In addition, the overall 
system has been simulated and implemented in an FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Array). An encrypted optical link has been 
tested with Ethernet data frames, concluding that it is possible to cipher traffic at this level, getting maximum throughput and 
hiding traffic pattern from passive eavesdroppers.  
Index Terms—Optical Communications, Ethernet, self-synchronous encryption, Pipeline Statistical Cipher Feedback.  
——————————      —————————— 
1 INTRODUCTION
ODAY, high speed optical networks are a reality. 
Thanks to the advances in these technologies it is pos-
sible to afford the bandwidth growth that nowadays mod-
ern applications demand [1], such as cloud computing and 
big data. In addition, information security has become an 
important issue as the volume of threat events has in-
creased over the last years [2]. Failures in security can lead 
to the malfunction of a service or the confidentiality loss in 
customer critical information. 
In a layered communication system, such as OSI (Open 
System Interconnection) or TCP/IP (Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol), passive or active attacks can 
be carried out at different communication levels. Depend-
ing on the communication layer, different approaches are 
used for getting information confidentiality. For example, 
standardized protocols such as MACsec [3] or IPsec [4] are 
usually used at layer 2 (Data link layer) and layer 3 (Net-
work layer), respectively. In these cases, encryption is car-
ried out in each frame individually. 
For the particular case of optical networks, the threat 
analysis in its physical layer is also considered critical to 
guarantee secure communications. [5], [6]. Among the 
most important attacks at this level, signal splitting attacks 
must be taken into consideration. Nowadays thanks to 
low-cost tapping techniques it is possible to intercept the 
optical signal without the need to perceptibly interfere in 
communications or create visible side-effects [7]. 
To deal with these threats and protect data confidenti-
ality, several physical layer mechanisms related with pho-
tonic technologies have been proposed [8], for example 
OCDM (Optical Code Division Multiplexing) [9], SCOC 
(Secure Communications using Optical Chaos) [10] or 
QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) [11]. Other techniques, 
related with physical layer protocols, cipher the infor-
mation at bit level, for example the encryption of OTN 
(Optical Transport Network) frame payloads [12]. Some of 
the advantages claimed by these techniques are that they 
achieve in-flight encryption introducing null overhead and 
a very low latency (in the range of nanoseconds) in data 
packets [12]. In fact, OTN communication equipment per-
forming encryption at line rate and getting a 100% 
throughput are already available on the market [13]. This 
contrasts with what protocols at other layers do [14], [15]. 
For example IPsec usually introduces latencies in the range 
of milliseconds. Moreover, the overhead introduced by IP-
sec during encryption limits the total throughput to values 
between 20% and 90% of the maximum achievable [16], 
[17]. 
Some applications for 10 Gigabit Ethernet standards are 
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Fig. 1.  Example of two different 10 Gigabit Ethernet standards in op-
tical networks for WAN and EFM applications: 10GBase-R (upper) 
and 10GBase-PR (lower). 
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shown in Fig. 1. Nowadays one of the most used technolo-
gies for the access to optical transport networks is Ethernet, 
and for high data rates 10 Gigabit Ethernet is widely de-
ployed in MAN (Metro Area Networks) and WAN (Wide 
Area Networks) environments. Optical 10 Gigabit Ethernet 
standards are also available for EFM (Ethernet in the First 
Mile) applications, allowing customers the access to the 
provider network through a PON (Passive Optical Net-
work) infrastructure. 
Regarding the physical layer security in these stand-
ards, a new mechanism was proposed in [18]. The encryp-
tion solution consisted of a symmetric chaotic stream ci-
pher, suitable for the encryption of 64b/66b blocks. This 
kind of encryption could provide the mentioned ad-
vantages such as maximum throughput and low latency. 
However, although stream ciphers are suitable for high 
speed applications, their cryptanalysis and design criteria 
are less understood than block ciphers [19]. Indeed a 
stream cipher application can be implemented easily 
thanks to a secure block cipher such as AES working in 
CTR mode, considered secure thanks to its formal security 
proof [20]. Furthermore, in [18] the implemented stream ci-
pher is based on a chaotic structure whose cryptanalysis 
could be not clear enough and it is mainly based on its ran-
domness analysis. 
On the other hand, the encryption system in [18] is not 
self-synchronized. To get synchronization, a mechanism 
was implemented based on the usage of new ordered sets 
in a specific 64b/66b block type, which increments the 
complexity of the overall system. In addition, in case of 
missing the synchronization in the middle of an encryption 
session there is a lack of a protocol to recover it.  
In this work, a complete solution to overcome the men-
tioned disadvantages is proposed.  
Regarding self-synchronization, in Ethernet data stream 
at PCS level there is no possibility to synchronize TX and 
RX stream ciphers thanks to standardized data fields or 
structures, as in OTN, where data stream is composed of 
continuous and periodic data containers. 
To get synchronization in the symmetric encryption 
scheme, a self-synchronized operating mode called PSCFB 
has been analyzed and implemented. Moreover, a formal 
security expression for this operation mode has been de-
duced, concluding that it can be considered secure in the 
same way as other traditional modes. 
The paper is divided into the following sections. Sec-
tion 2 explains PCS layer encryption necessities when us-
ing 64b/66b encoding, in Section 3 an introduction to the 
PSCFB (Pipeline Statistical Cipher Feedback) mode of op-
eration is made. In Section 4 IND-CPA (Indistinguishabil-
ity under Chosen-Plaintext Attack) advantage expression 
for this operation mode is proposed. Subsequently, Section 
5 deals with the practical case of 10 Gigabit Ethernet, par-
ticularly with the standard 10 GBase-R, and the overall 
scheme of the proposed encryption system. In Section 6, 
the hardware implementation of the cipher is described 
while in Section 7 results of the encryption are explained. 
Other security considerations as key distribution are taken 
into account in Section 8. Finally, in Section 9 conclusions 
are given. 
2 CODING PRESERVING ENCRYPTION 
Typically, in Ethernet standards, the physical layer is di-
vided into three sublayers, PCS (Physical Coding Sub-
layer), PMD (Physical Medium Dependent) and PMA 
(Physical Medium Attachment). The Physical Coding Sub-
layer carries out functions such as link establishment, clock 
rate adaptation, data encoding and scrambling.  
Optical Ethernet standards are high-speed communica-
tion systems where a baseband serial data transmission is 
carried out while clock frequency information is embed-
ded in the serial bitstream itself. At the receiver, the clock 
recovery circuits must be able to extract the frequency in-
formation thanks to the bit transitions in the data stream. 
After that, serial data sampling can be made at the appro-
priate time. In order to facilitate the work of the CDR 
(Clock and Data Recovery) circuit, information must be en-
coded in such a way that a good transition density and a 
short run length are achieved. Also a DC-balanced serial 
data stream must be guaranteed, which is important for 
some transmission media, such as optical links. 
In the case of PCS sublayers using a dense coding such 
as 64b/66b the mentioned properties, DC-balance and 
transition density, are achieved in a statistical way thanks 
to the scrambling of the bitstream. On the other hand, the 
short run length is guaranteed thanks to a synchronization 
header at the beginning of each 66-bit block, whose only 
two possible values are ‘10’ or ‘01’. 
Usually stream ciphers are implemented by carrying 
out the XOR operation between the plaintext and a key-
stream obtained from a secure pseudorandom generator. 
In case of using physical layer encryption in the PCS sub-
layer, it is necessary to preserve the properties of the block 
line encoder, therefore the location of the XOR operation 
in the datapath must be taken into account. For 64b/66b 
encoding where firstly the blocks of bits are formatted and 
finally processed by a scrambler, the stream cipher should 
implement the XOR operation before the scrambler to 
guarantee that the scrambler transfers its statistical prop-
erties to the resulting bitstream before being transmitted. 
As mentioned before, the synchronization header of 
 
Fig. 2.  Location and generic structure of a stream cipher in a physical 
layer with a dense block line encoding. In the case of 64b/66b encod-
ing, parameters 𝑛, 𝑚, and 𝑏 are 64, 66 and 65 bits, respectively. The 
output of the encoder is a 66-bit block whose 2-bit header is mapped 
to a value ‘0’ or ‘1’ and concatenated with the rest of the block in the 
HEADER MAP module. The result is a 65-bit block that is encrypted 
in a one-time pad fashion thanks to the XOR operation. 
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each 66-bit block is composed of a pair of bits with two 
possible values ‘01’ or ‘10'. On the one hand, it is necessary 
for avoiding long runs of zeros or ones, which limits the 
run length to a maximum of 66 bits. On the other hand, it 
is used to detect the 66-bit block boundary in the receiver 
and perform the decoding process properly. For this rea-
son, this 2-bit header is kept untouched and is not scram-
bled as the rest of the 66 bit block.  
To preserve the two-bit transition of the sync header, 
the XOR operation must be carried out as shown in Fig. 2. 
The 2-bit header must be mapped to values ‘0’ or ‘1’ de-
pending on whether it is equal to ‘01’ or ‘10’, respectively. 
Then the mapped value is concatenated to the 64-bit block 
payload. These two operations are performed in the 
HEADER_MAP block. The resulting output is a 65-bit 
word that is XORed with the keystream, giving a new 65-
bit word. The first bit of this word will be reverse mapped 
giving the new 2-bit header while the subsequent 64 bits 
will be directly the new payload. The concatenation of both 
data fields will result on the new ciphered 66-bit block. 
These last operations are performed in the HEADER_RE-
VERSE_MAP module.  
3 SELF-SYNCHRONIZED ENCRYPTION 
3.1 Self-synchronized Stream Ciphers 
Self-synchronized stream ciphers usually generate the 
keystream as a function of the key and the preceding ci-
phered bitstream. In spite of its self-synchronizing proper-
ties, this kind of ciphers are less understood and their se-
curity analysis is more difficult than typical synchronized 
stream ciphers. Indeed, there are few proposals of these al-
gorithms. For example, only two of the proposed stream 
ciphers in eSTREAM project, SSS and Mosquito were self-
synchronized [21]. However, they were dismissed owing 
to their vulnerabilities [22], [23].  
On the other hand, stream ciphers can also be based on 
different operating modes of block ciphers, such as OFB 
(Output Feedback), CFB (Cipher Feedback) or CTR (Coun-
ter) modes [24]. For self-synchronized purposes CFB is the 
only one recommended by the NIST (National Institute of 
Standards and Technology). However, to achieve synchro-
nization with a loss of an arbitrary number of bits, CFB 
mode must only feedback one ciphertext bit for every 
block cipher operation. For this reason, if the block size of 
the underlying block cipher working in CFB mode is 𝐿, the 
CFB resulting throughput  would be 1/𝐿 of the underlying 
block cipher. 
To solve this throughput limitation, SCFB (Statistical Ci-
pher Feedback) [25] and OCFB (Optimized Cipher Feed-
back) [26] modes were proposed. Particularly, SCFB was 
deeply analyzed in [27], [28], and in [29] was compared 
with OCFB, resulting in better properties for high-speed 
physical layer security. In spite of this advantage, it is rec-
ommended that an implementation of conventional SCFB 
be constrained to 50% of the throughput of its underlying 
block cipher. This constraint is necessary to ensure that no 
bits are lost due to queue overflow in the SCFB system. 
To overcome this limitation, PSCFB (Pipelined Statisti-
cal Cipher Feedback) was proposed [30]. This mode allows 
an efficient utilization of a block cipher using a pipeline ar-
chitecture, which results in implementations with a 
throughput near to 100%. 
 
3.2 PSCFB Mode of Operation 
The PSCFB mode of operation is essentially a hybrid of 
CFB and CTR modes, where the underlying block cipher is 
implemented with a pipelined architecture of  𝑃 stages and 
a block size of 𝐿 bits. Let us assume that the cipher is con-
figured with a key 𝐾 and it has an encryption function   
𝐸𝐾(∙). The cipher operates in conventional CTR mode 
while scanning the ciphertext looking for a special  𝑛-bit 
length synchronization pattern. Assuming that the under-
lying block cipher is a good PRP (Pseudo Random Permu-
tation), each value of the keystream block cipher output 
can be seen as randomly and independently chosen, giving 
also random and independent values of ciphertext blocks 
after performing the XOR. Therefore, the sync pattern will 
be observed at a statistically random point in the ciphertext 
stream. When this pattern is detected, the next 𝐿  bits are 
captured and used as an initialization vector (𝐼𝑉) that feeds 
back the counter value at the block cipher input. Therefore, 
it can be considered that the block cipher temporarily 
works in CFB mode. On the other hand, it is necessary to 
disable the sync pattern scanning since the 𝐼𝑉 is captured 
until 𝐸𝐾(𝐼𝑉) is available as new keystream block. This in-
terval is called the blackout period. 
 In Fig. 3 and Fig. 4 the structure of PSCFB mode and the 
 
Fig. 4.  Structure of the synchronization period in PSCFB mode. A 
complete synchronization period is formed by the sync pattern, black-
out period and scan period. As the cipher has  𝑃 stages, the encrypted 
value of the 𝐼𝑉, 𝐸𝐾(𝐼𝑉) is used as keystream  𝑃 blocks later, when it 
has been fed back as a new counter value. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3.  Structure of PSCFB mode for encryption and decryption. The 
block cipher 𝐸𝐾(∙) has a block size of 𝐿 bits, and is implemented us-
ing 𝑃 internal stages. The difference between the encryption and de-
cryption is that the sync pattern scan is performed after the XOR op-
eration in the transmitter and before the XOR in the receiver. 
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complete synchronization cycle are shown, respectively.  
4 SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
4.1 Background of PSCFB security 
Regarding to the security of SCFB and PSCFB modes, the 
probability of generating repeated keystream blocks has 
been analyzed in [22] and [27]. If the counter reaches some 
value already used in previous synchronization cycles, the 
keystream will be repeated until next sync pattern detec-
tion. This issue would compromise the security of these 
modes. 
The conclusion of these analyses is that the probability 
of repeated keystream is very low for both modes with typ-
ical size parameters, such as 128-bit block size. However, 
although PSCFB mode is built from two secure modes, 
CTR and CFB, with formal security proofs [20] [26], no for-
mal security proof exists for PSCFB, and it has been let as 
an open problem [30]. 
In this section we discuss the security for PSCFB mode. 
This mode can be considered similar to other one called 
CTR$, for which a security proof exists. Based on this proof 
it is possible to derive a formal security expression for 
PSCFB for the first time and determine under which con-
ditions it can be considered, at least, as secure as other tra-
ditional modes, e.g. CTR. 
In the next subsection, CTR$ mode and its formal secu-
rity proof are introduced. Authors consider that this expla-
nation is convenient for the understanding of subsection 
4.3, where the IND-CPA advantage for PSCFB is derived. 
 
4.2 CTRC and CTR$ Modes 
Concrete security analysis for CTRC and CTR$ were 
originally established in [20]. The CTRC scheme is a state-
ful (counter based and deterministic) while the CTR$ is a 
stateless (randomized) variant of CTRC. 
Let us consider a family of functions 𝐹 such that: 𝐹: 𝐾 ×
 {0, 1}𝑙 →  {0, 1}𝐿 where 𝐿 is the block size and 𝐾 the 
keyspace. Given a plaintext  𝑀 formed by 𝑚 𝐿-bit blocks 
{𝑀0, 𝑀1, … , 𝑀m−1}, then the 𝑚 blocks of the output cipher-
text 𝐶𝑖  are obtained in each Sℰ (encryption scheme)  CTRC 
and CTR$, applying their encryption functions. Encryp-
tion function for CTR$ is shown in Algorithm 1. 
 
Algorithm 1. Function  ℰ−𝐶𝑇𝑅$𝐹(𝑀) 
𝑅
$
← {0, 1}𝑙 
𝐶𝑁𝑇0 = 𝑅 + 1 
𝐾𝑖 = 𝐹𝐾[𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖] 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 0,1, … , 𝑚 − 1 
𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖+1 = 𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖 + 1 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 0, 1, … , 𝑚 − 2 
𝐶𝑖 = (𝑀𝑖 ⊕ 𝐾𝑖) 𝑓𝑜𝑟 𝑖 = 0, 1, … , 𝑚 − 1 
Return {𝐶0, 𝐶1, … , 𝐶m−1} 
 
In this algorithm 𝐶𝑁𝑇𝑖  and 𝐾𝑖 are the values of the coun-
ter and keystream block in each encryption step.  𝐹𝐾  is the 
underlying encryption function and 𝑅 is an 𝑙-bit random 
value. In CTR$ the counter is set to a random value 𝑅 at the 
beginning of each message encryption. 
Usually the security of these modes is studied in the 
sense of IND-CPA (Indistinguishability under Chosen-
Plaintext Attack) security [31]. An advantage expression is 
obtained thanks to a game between an active adversary A 
and an encryption oracle performing the encryption 
scheme Sℰ, configured with a key K and an experiment bit 
b.  
It is demonstrated in [32] that an adversary B attacking 
the PRF security of 𝐹𝐾  can be built thanks to the adversary 
A and their advantages are related as follows: 
 
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆ℰ(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) = 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝐵) + 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆ℰ(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴)     (1) 
 
where 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆𝐸(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) is the advantage of A attacking Sℰ 
when its underlying encryption function is a PRF 𝐹𝐾 , 
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆𝐸(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) is the advantage of A over Sℰ when the un-
derlying encryption function is a random function 
𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐(𝑙, 𝐿) and 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝐵)  is the prf-advantage of B as de-
fined in [31].  
In the formal security proofs of CTRC and CTR$ modes 
the term 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆𝐸(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) is obtained [32], then allowing to 
reach the final advantage expression. It is proven that: 
 
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆ℰ(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) ≤ Pr (𝑐𝑜𝑙)                        (2) 
 
where Pr (𝑐𝑜𝑙) is the probability of a collision among the 
counter values used during the game. 
Given the experiment bit b, during the attacking game 
the adversary performs 𝑞 queries of a pair of messages. For 
each pair (𝑀𝑖
0, 𝑀𝑖
1) it receives from the oracle the ciphertext 
𝐶𝑖 corresponding to the message 𝑀𝑖
𝑏 . Assuming that each 
encrypted message 𝑀𝑖
𝑏 has a length of 𝑚𝑖 blocks, the coun-
ters used during the game session can be represented as in 
the following table: 
 
𝑟1 + 1,  𝑟1 + 2, … , 𝑟1 + 𝑚1  
𝑟2 + 1,  𝑟2 + 1, … , 𝑟2 + 𝑚2 (3) 
…           …            …  
𝑟𝑞 + 1,  𝑟𝑞 + 1, … , 𝑟𝑞 + 𝑚𝑞  
 
where 𝑟𝑖 is the randomized counter value loaded at the be-
ginning of the message 𝑀𝑖
𝑏 with length 𝑚𝑖. The subsequent 
counters from 𝑟𝑖 in advance will be incremented up to 𝑟𝑖 +
𝑚𝑖. According to (3), the probability of collision of every 
counter value, Pr(𝑐𝑜𝑙), can be bounded with the following 
expression: 
  
Pr (𝑐𝑜𝑙) ≤
(𝑞 − 1) ∙ ∑ 𝑚𝑖
𝑖=𝑞
𝑖=1
2𝑙
 
(4) 
Thanks to (4) it is possible to derive an upper bound 
for 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆ℰ(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴), and by replacing it in (1), the final 
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑆ℰ(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) expression of CTR$ mode. 
 
4.3 PSCFB vs CTR$ 
In PSCFB, the sync pattern will be observed at a statisti-
cally random point in the keystream. On the other hand, if 
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the block cipher is considered a good PRF and there are no 
collisions among the counter values, ciphertext blocks can 
be considered random and independent. Therefore, we can 
consider the new 𝐼𝑉 as a random value. As we consider the 
block cipher 𝐹 such that: 𝐹: 𝐾 ×  {0, 1}𝑙 →  {0, 1}𝐿, in this 
section we let the 𝐼𝑉 be an 𝑙-bit word and the blackout pe-
riod will have a length of (𝑃 − 1) ∙ 𝐿 + 𝑙 bits. 
Let us assume that the adversary tries a game over an 
oracle performing a PSCFB encryption scheme. The adver-
sary sends 𝑞 queries to the oracle, but now, unlike the 
CTR$ mode, the counter of the PSCFB scheme is not rei-
nitiated randomly at the beginning of each message. The 
counter could be reseeded at a random point of each mes-
sage. Depending on the length of the messages this initial-
ization could happen more or fewer times. For example if 
the length of a message is shorter than the mean synchro-
nization period, possibly in that message only a new sync 
pattern is received and then the counter is reinitiated only 
once to a random 𝐼𝑉. However, for longer messages this 
could happen more times.  
In general, in CTRC, CTR$ and PSCFB we can under-
stand that the counter behaves in a cyclic fashion during 
the encryption session. We call this type of cycle a counter 
window. Inside each window, the counter is incremented 
and not repeated.  In the case of CTRC there is only one 
counter window, which means that the counter is initial-
ized only once, at the beginning of the first message, and 
never repeated. In CTR$ there are so many windows as en-
crypted messages because the counter is reinitialized ran-
domly at the beginning of each message. In the same way 
in PSCFB there are so many windows as synchronization 
cycles are produced during the whole session, as the coun-
ter is reseeded at the beginning of each blackout period. 
The counter window will start at the beginning of a scan 
period and will finish at the end of the next blackout pe-
riod, as shown in Fig. 5. 
In addition, the counter window length is different in 
each mode. In CTRC and CTR$ the length is a number of 
bits that is multiple of the block size, while in PSCFB it  is 
multiple of the block size plus a random number of bits 
between 0 and the block size. This fact depends on when 
the end of the blackout period happens, as it could be not 
aligned with the end of an encrypted block of bits. An ex-
ample is shown in Fig. 5, where the counter windows 𝐼𝑉0 
and 𝐼𝑉1 do not finish exactly in block boundaries. 
Starting from (1), which can be considered generic for 
any counter encryption scheme we will have: 
 
 
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) = 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝐵) + 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴 (𝐴) (5) 
 
As we can consider PSCFB a counter mode, it is possible 
to make the same assumptions as in  [32] to reach equation 
(6), that is, if the block cipher is a good PRF and there are 
no repeated counter values during the game session, then 
the adversary has zero advantage in winning the game and 
the encryption scheme behaves as a one-time pad. Then 
next condition is fulfilled: 
 
 
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵(𝐹𝑢𝑛𝑐)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴 (𝐴) ≤ Pr (𝑐𝑜𝑙)                   (6) 
 
During the game session the adversary sends 𝑞 mes-
sages of length 𝑚𝑖 blocks. The block size is 𝐿  bits and the 
total number of bits in the session is 𝜇. Let us assume that 
in the case of PSCFB 𝑁 sync cycles happen during the 
whole session. Therefore we can consider that the counter 
table (3) for PSCFB can be represented as: 
 
𝑟1,  𝑟1 + 1, … , 𝑟1 + 𝑘1 − 1  
𝑟2,  𝑟2 + 1, … , 𝑟2 + 𝑘2 − 1 (7) 
…           …            …  
𝑟𝑁 ,  𝑟𝑁 + 1, … , 𝑟𝑁 + 𝑘𝑁 − 1  
 
where 𝑘𝑖 is the length in data blocks for the i-th counter 
window. As the bit length of a counter window could not 
be a multiple of the block size, the length 𝑘𝑖 will be: 𝑘𝑖 =
⌈𝜇𝑖/𝐿⌉, where  𝜇𝑖  is its length in bits and the operator ⌈∙⌉ 
means its rounded up value. 
 
Fig. 5.  Counter windows in PSCFB mode. Each 𝐼𝑉 used in each counter window is captured in the previous one. For example, 𝐼𝑉1 is captured 
at the beginning of the blackout period in counter window 𝐼𝑉0. Then its encrypted value 𝐹𝐾(𝐼𝑉1) is used as the first keystream block in next scan 
period (in counter window 𝐼𝑉1). In counter window 𝐼𝑉𝑖 the counter 𝑟𝑖 takes values from 𝐼𝑉𝑖 to 𝐼𝑉𝑖 + 𝑘𝑖 − 1 where 𝑘𝑖 = ⌈𝜇𝑖/𝐿⌉, 𝜇𝑖 is the length in 
bits of this counter window and 𝐿 is the block size. 
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As in (4), Pr(𝑐𝑜𝑙) for PSCFB case is obtained: 
  
Pr(𝑐𝑜𝑙) ≤
(𝑁 − 1) ∙ ∑ 𝑘𝑖
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
2𝑙
 
(8) 
Since 𝑘𝑖 = ⌈𝜇𝑖/𝐿⌉ ≤ 𝜇𝑖/𝐿 + 1, then: 
  
Pr(𝑐𝑜𝑙) ≤
(𝑁 − 1) ∙ ∑ (𝜇𝑖/𝐿 + 1)
𝑖=𝑁
𝑖=1
2𝑙
≤
𝑁 ∙ (
𝜇
𝐿 + 𝑁)
2𝑙
 (9) 
 
Let us consider 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 the maximum number of sync cycles 
in 𝜇 bits and 𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 the minimun posible size of a sync cycle. 
Therefore 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝜇/𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛. Let 𝐶 = (𝑃 − 1) ∙ 𝐿 + 𝑙, since 
𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 = (𝑃 − 1) ∙ 𝐿 + 𝑙 + 𝑛, then 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 𝜇/𝐶𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝜇/𝐶. 
Therefore, it is possible to rewrite equation (9) as: 
  
Pr(𝑐𝑜𝑙) ≤
𝜇
𝐶 ∙ (
𝜇
𝐿 +
𝜇
𝐶)
2𝑙
=
𝜇2
2𝑙
∙
𝐶 + 𝐿
𝐶2 ∙ 𝐿
 (10) 
 
Finally, according to (5), the IND-CPA advantage of adver-
sary A against PSCFB can be expressed as: 
  
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) ≤ 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝐵) +
𝜇2
2𝑙
∙
𝐶 + 𝐿
𝐶2 ∙ 𝐿
 (11) 
Although block ciphers are analyzed as PRFs, their input 
and output size are equal, therefore if we consider that 𝐿 =
𝑙 , 𝐶 = 𝑃 ∙ 𝐿, then the advantage result is: 
  
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) ≤ 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝐵) +
𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
∙
𝑃 + 1
𝑃2
 (12) 
Supposing that the term 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝐵) is negligible,  
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵
𝑃𝑅𝐹 (𝐴) will be negligible when the following condi-
tion is accomplished: 
  
𝐿22𝐿 ∙ (
𝑃2
𝑃 + 1
) ≫  𝜇2 
(13) 
We can conclude that the PSCFB mode can be considered 
secure under certain conditions, in the same way that hap-
pens with CTR$ mode. According to (12), the advantage of 
an adversary over PSCFB will be reduced if the size of the 
blackout period P is lengthened, which is directly related 
with the number of pipeline stages with which the block 
cipher has been implemented. It is a coherent result, be-
cause the longer the sync period the fewer random counter 
initializations will be produced, consequently reducing the 
probability of a collision and increasing the security. How-
ever, as proved in [30] longer 𝑃 means worst values of SRD 
(Synchronization Recovery Delay) and EPF (Error Propa-
gation Factor) in the PSCFB system. It is possible to con-
clude that there is a compromise between security and in-
herent properties of PSCFB measured by SRD and EPF. 
 
4.4 PSCFB vs CTR 
As mentioned before, usually block ciphers are analyzed 
as PRFs, however it is well known that the PRPs (Pseudo 
Random Permutation) are what best models them. It is 
known that the prp-security and prf-security of a block ci-
pher are related thanks to the PRF-PRP switching lemma 
[20]. Due to this, the overall advantage of the adversary A 
over the CTRC scheme is degraded by an amount given by 
the birthday attack, it is 𝜇2/𝐿22𝐿+1 , which means that its 
advantage can be written as: 
  
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐶𝑇𝑅𝐶(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) ≤ 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝑃(𝐵) +
𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
 (14) 
The same consideration can be taken for PSCFB, for which 
advantage can also be rewritten as: 
  
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) ≤ 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝑃(𝐵) +
𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
+ 
+
𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
∙ (
1
𝑃
+
1
𝑃2
) 
(15) 
 
which means that: 
  
𝐴𝐷𝑉𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵(𝐹)
𝐼𝑁𝐷−𝐶𝑃𝐴(𝐴) ≤ 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝑃(𝐵) + 
+
𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
∙ (1 +
1
𝑃
+
1
𝑃2
) 
(16) 
 
In Table 1, a comparison between the derived advantage of 
PSCFB and other operation modes is shown. As mentioned 
in [33] CTRC can be considered the best and most modern 
way to achieve privacy-only encryption. For this reason it 
is useful to make a comparison between the IND-CPA ad-
vantages between this mode and PSCFB. 
Let us suppose that the underlying block ciphers for the 
two modes, CTRC and PSCFB, are good PRPs and have the 
TABLE 1 
IND-CPA ADVANTAGE COMPARISON OF DIFFERENT MODES 
Encryption 
Mode 𝑺𝓔(𝑭) 
IND-CPA Advantage expression1 
 𝑨𝑫𝑽𝑺𝓔(𝑭)
𝑰𝑵𝑫−𝑪𝑷𝑨(𝑨) 
PSCFB 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝑃(𝐵) +
𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
∙ (1 +
1
𝑃
+
1
𝑃2
) 
CTRC 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝑃(𝐵) +
𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
 
CTR$ 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝑃(𝐵) +
2𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
 
CBC 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝑃(𝐵) +
2𝜇2
𝐿22𝐿
 
CFB2 2 ∙ 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹(𝐵) +
𝜇2
𝑚22𝐿+1
 
1In each expression L is the block size and µ the number of encrypted bits. 
2The term 𝐴𝐷𝑉𝐹
𝑃𝑅𝐹refers to the prf-advantage where 𝐹𝐾 is the function 
𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡(𝐸𝐾(∙)).𝐸𝐾(∙) is the block cipher with blocksize L and  𝑠𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡(∙) is a 
function that outputs m fixed bits from its input. 
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same prp-security, then we can stablish under what values 
of block size and pipelining the block cipher in PSCFB 
mode has at least the same security as that in CTRC when 
encrypting the same amount of information. For this pur-
pose we should compare the second terms of (14) and (15) 
as follows: 
  
𝜇2
𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵
2 ∙ 2𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵
∙ (1 +
1
𝑃
+
1
𝑃2
) ≤
𝜇2
𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑅
2 ∙ 2𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑅
 (17) 
 
where 𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 and 𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑅 are the block sizes of the underlying 
block ciphers in PSCFB and CTRC modes respectively. Ac-
cording to (17), we can deduce the block size that a secure 
pipelined block cipher should have in case of being used 
in PSCFB mode if we want to provide the same security as 
another one with the same prp-security working in CTRC 
mode. 
For example, let us assume that we have an AES (Ad-
vance Encryption Standard) block cipher working in CTRC 
mode, then 𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑅 = 128 bits. We can stablish the value of 
𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 provided that: 
  
𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵
2 ∙ 2𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 ≥ 𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑅
2 ∙ 2𝐿𝐶𝑇𝑅 (1 +
1
𝑃
+
1
𝑃2
)
= 2142 ∙ (1 +
1
𝑃
+
1
𝑃2
) 
(18) 
As 𝑃 ≥ 1 the right term will be maximum with P=1, then 
 
𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵
2 ∙ 2𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 ≥ 2142 ∙ 3                         (19) 
 
This inequality is fulfilled with 𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 ≥ 130 bits. For 𝑃 >
1 the condition is fulfilled with 𝐿𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 > 128.  
Therefore, we can conclude that given two block ci-
phers with the same prp-security that work in two differ-
ent modes, CTRC and PSCFB, if the block size of the one 
working in CTRC is 128 bits, then the other must have a 
block size larger than 128 to get the same or better IND-
CPA security when encrypting the same amount of data. 
In case of setting the same block size for both block ci-
phers, to get better IND-CPA security in PSCFB mode, less 
amount of data could be encrypted per key session. 
5 APPLICATION CASE: ETHERNET 10GBASE-R 
In this paper we have focused on the case of high-speed 
communications, particularly in the 10GBase-R standard 
used in 10 Gigabit Ethernet optical links. In this standard, 
the PCS level is responsible for generating, encoding and 
scrambling the control and data blocks that are transmitted 
to the optical line. As block line coding is 64b/66b, the pur-
pose of the encryption will be to cipher the complete 
64b/66b block flow as shown in Fig. 2. 
Because no extra data fields are added to the packets 
when they are encrypted, then no overhead is introduced 
and no throughput loss is produced. Moreover it not only 
encrypts the contents of the packets but also the activity or 
data traffic pattern. This is because by encrypting at 
64b/66b block level, control blocks are also encrypted, 
such as packet start and end blocks or control blocks full of 
idle characters when no traffic is transmitted or during the 
IFGs (Inter Frame Gaps). Thanks to this last property, se-
curity could be improved, as passive eavesdroppers would 
be prevented from performing traffic analysis attacks. It 
would be useful in scenarios where traffic pattern analysis 
could reveal sensitive information about the behavior of a 
critical infrastructure or facility. 
In this work the keystream generator of Fig. 2 has been 
implemented thanks to a block cipher working in PSCFB 
mode. As concluded in Section 4.4, to provide the same se-
curity level as a 128-bit block cipher working in CTRC 
mode when transmitting the same amount of data, it is nec-
essary to use a block cipher with larger block size. In par-
ticular, for 𝑃 > 1 this block size must be larger than 128 
 
Fig. 6.  Overall structure of the PSCFB system in the encryption module. In the decryption side the scheme is the same, however the check 
pattern input is taken directly from the input buffer output, before performing the XOR operation. 
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bits. 
A possible block cipher candidate could be the well-
known cipher Rijndael [34]. The main difference between 
Rijndael and AES is the range of configuration values for 
the block size and key length. Particularly, AES is a subset 
of Rijndael that uses a fixed block size of 128 bits and a key 
length of 128, 192 or 256 bits. On the contrary, the original 
specification of Rijndael also included 192 and 256 bits as 
possible block sizes. However, only the subset correspond-
ing to the current version of AES was standardized by 
NIST, and as far as the authors know, there is no recom-
mended block cipher with a block size greater than 128 
bits. 
Other solution for building a suitable and standardized 
block cipher with more than 128-bits block size is the use 
of the recent FPE (Format Preserving Encryption) modes 
approved by NIST [35]. FPE modes encrypt plaintext in a 
ciphertext preserving its original format and length. Typi-
cal applications of this modes are the encryption of PANs 
(Primary Account Numbers) or SSNs (Social Security 
Numbers) where a standard block cipher would not pre-
serve their format.  
Currently, two FPE modes are recommended by NIST, 
FF1 and FF3 [35]. Both modes are based on a non-binary 
Feistel structure, whose underlying round function con-
sists of an AES block cipher. These are considered AES 
modes allowing to configure the block size and data radix 
of the resulting FPE block cipher. 
Between the two NIST recommendations, we have se-
lected FF3, as it is built with less rounds in its Feistel net-
work and the cost in hardware resources is lower. In this 
mode the block size is limited according to the radix used, 
as shown in (20): 
 
𝑅 ⋲ [2 … 216]  
𝑅𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑛 ≥ 100                              (20) 
2 ≤ 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑛 ≤ 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑒𝑛 ≤ 2⎿𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅(2
96)⏌  
 
where 𝑅 is the radix and 𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑙𝑒𝑛 and 𝑚𝑎𝑥𝑙𝑒𝑛 the bounds 
for the block size. With 𝑅 = 2, the block size is between 2 
and 192. 
In this work the selected value for block size is the max-
imum, 𝐿 = 192. With this size it is possible to get a major 
margin of cycles available per stage in a possible pipelined 
architecture. This fact allows a better reuse of the hardware 
resources. 
According to this parameter, the final structure of the 
self-synchronized encryption system is shown in Fig. 6. It 
is similar to Fig. 2, but the keystream generator has been 
replaced with the final self-synchronous PSCFB structure 
based on AES in FPE mode. Also, in this figure it is shown 
that buffers are required at the input and output sides of 
the encryption structure. They are necessary to achieve 
100% efficiency of the final encryption scheme. 
6 SYSTEM IMPLEMENTATION 
6.1 PSCFB System Implementation 
The underlying block cipher of the implemented PSCFB 
mode has been built using an FF3 structure. FF3 algorithm 
is described in [35]. In this work the cipher tweak value has 
been set to zero, while only the key is configurable. Taking 
into account the selected parameters for our FF3 imple-
mentation, 𝑅 = 2 and 𝐿 = 192, its structure is shown in 
Fig. 7 where one AES core is used each four stages of the 
Feistel network. The final latency introduced in its pipe-
lined structure is 58 cycles. 
Regarding to the system throughput, the efficiency 𝜂 of 
an encryption scheme represents the amount of ciphered 
information that it can produce relative to the number of 
bits generated by its underlying block cipher. In the case of 
PSCFB, as the sync cycle length can be different to a multi-
ple of the block size in bits, then not all blocks produced by 
the block cipher will be used completely for encryption. In-
deed, the end of the blackout period could not be aligned 
 
Fig. 7.  Structure of the Feistel network for the 192-bit FPE cipher. 
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with a kesytream block ending. It means that in the last 
block cipher operation of the blackout period the block ci-
pher output could be used partially producing less cipher-
text bits than the block size. 
As explained in [30], it can be shown that the efficiency 
can be lower bounded by  𝜂 = 𝑃/(𝑃 + 1), which means that 
for 𝑇 bits produced by the block cipher output at least        
𝑇 ∙ 𝑃/(𝑃 + 1) ciphertext bits of PSCFB are generated. 
Therefore, to generate the ciphertext stream at the 100% 
throughput rate of a 10 Gbps Ethernet system, it is neces-
sary to overclock the PSCFB subsystem with respect to the 
PCS sublayer. For this reason the two buffers shown in Fig. 
6 have been introduced, to isolate the different clock do-
mains of PSCFB and PCS. 
On the other hand, these buffers also work as the in-
put/output queues defined in the original specification of 
PSCFB, necessary to store information temporarily during 
periods of resynchronization, where partial block cipher 
outputs are used to encrypt data due to the fact that the 
sync pattern is not aligned with the end of the block cipher 
output. 
Taking into account that the bus widths for PSCFB and 
PCS are 192 and 65 bits respectively, and equating the PCS 
64b/66b bit throughput with that of the PSCFB, the follow-
ing condition must be achieved: 
  
𝑇𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 ∙ 192 = 𝜂 ∙ 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐸 ∙ 192 = 𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆 ∙ 65 (21) 
  
where 𝑇𝑃𝑆𝐶𝐹𝐵 , 𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐸 and 𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆 are the word throughputs of 
PSCFB, FPE and PCS domains, respectively, measured in 
words per second. 
As in our FF3 implementation we are using two AES 
cores that have to attend to four stages each one, the total 
throughput of each AES core, 𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑆,  will be four times that 
of the FF3. Then (21) can be rewritten as: 
  
𝑃
𝑃 + 1
∙
𝑇𝐴𝐸𝑆
4
∙ 192 = 𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆 ∙ 65 (22) 
As P=58 and the PCS word rate is 156.25 MHz, the result-
ing clock frequency at which AES cores should work for 
getting a 100% throughput is 215.24 MHz. In this work the 
total frequency used for PSCFB system has been set to 
217 MHz. 
The described system in Fig. 6 has been implemented 
in a Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA (Field Programmable Gate Ar-
ray). In Table 2, the hardware resources of the PSCFB sys-
tem are shown. It includes the resources used by the main 
modules in Fig. 6, KEYSTREAM_GENERATOR and CI-
PHER_OPERATION. Moreover, in Table 2, a comparison 
in terms of LUTs (Look-Up Tables), registers and BRAMs 
(Block RAMs) is made between this work and other imple-
mentations [36], [37]. Particularly, in [36] the FPGA used is 
a Virtex-6 device, different model than in this work, how-
ever the CLB structure in both devices is similar in terms 
of LUTs and registers, with four six-input LUTs and eight 
registers per slice. Although the implementation in this 
work entails more hardware resources, the ratio Encryp-
tion_Rate/Slice is clearly superior. 
In general, although the inherent structure of an AES in 
FPE mode consumes more resources than the AES core, au-
thors have considered this option to grant that the security 
of the PSCFB system is not degraded in respect a typical 
 
Fig. 8.  Structure of the 10G Ethernet interface including the encryption function. It is composed by the MAC module, the PCS and the SERDES. 
In the PCS layer, TX_ENCRYPT and RX_DECRYPT are the encryption/decryption modules. Both include the CIPHER_OPERATION and 
KEYSTREAM_GENERATOR modules shown in Fig. 8. 
TABLE 2 
COMPARISON WITH OTHER SOLUTIONS 
 
FF1 
[36] 
FF3 
[36] 
FF3 
[37] 
This 
work 
Slice Registers 11285 5592 11127 19154 
Slice LUTs 7426 3587 16978 17599 
18K Block RAMs1 343 170 77 153 
Slices2 3268 1596 5636 6794 
Operation Freq. 
(MHz) 
279.6 283.5 125 217 
Cycles/Encryption 707 269 1 1 
Bytes/Encryption 13 13 1 192 
Encryption Rate 
(Mbps) 
41.1 109.6 1000  10000 
Encryption 
Rate/Slice 
(Kbps/Slice) 
12.57 68.7 177.4 1471.8 
1The 153 Block RAMs used in this work are due to the AES cores. 
2Slices are estimated from the number of register and LUTs, assuming they 
are not packed together.  
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CTRC implementation of AES. On the other hand, alt-
hough implementations of a 192-bit block cipher such as 
Rijndael could have been possible, they are not recom-
mended by NIST, as the FPE option is. 
 
6.2 Test Setup 
To carry out the test of the system, the proposed encryp-
tion scheme has been integrated in a 10GBase-R Ethernet 
interface. In Fig. 8, the complete PCS structure is shown. 
Apart from the 64b/66b encoding and scrambling func-
tions it contains the encryption and decryption modules. 
Moreover, a traffic generator has been also imple-
mented and linked to the Ethernet interface to test it with 
real data frames. Two chains composed each one by the 
10GBase-R Ethernet interface and a frame generator have 
been implemented over the Xilinx Virtex 7 FPGA. Both 
Ethernet interfaces have been connected to two SFP+ 
(Small Form-factor Pluggable) modules configured to 
work at 10 Gbps speed and linked between them with a 
multimode fiber patch cord. Some of the parameters of the 
transmitter/receiver and the fiber link are shown in Table 
3. 
A scheme of the setup for test is shown in Fig. 9. Thanks 
to the Ethernet frame generators, it has been possible to 
check the encrypted link with real data packets without 
producing any frame loss or CRC (Cyclic Redundancy 
Check) errors. 
The extra hardware resources introduced in the PCS 
datapath generate an extra latency of 266 ns for both trans-
mission and reception. It is noteworthy that the proposed 
encryption system gets values comparable to those 
achieved by OTN equipment [12]. Moreover, no overhead 
is introduced in the encryption process allowing data be 
encrypted at line rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(a)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(c) 
Fig. 10. (a) SYNC header pattern without encryption when no Ethernet frame is transmitted; (b) SYNC header pattern without encryption when 
transmitting an Ethernet frame burst; (c) SYNC header pattern after encryption regardless of the transmission or non-transmission of Ethernet 
frames. 
 
 
Fig. 9.  Test setup scheme with SFP+ modules working at 10Gbps 
rate. 
 
TABLE 3 
OPTICAL LINK PARAMETERS 
 Parameter Value 
Transmitter Average Launch Power (dBm) -1 
 Optical Wavelength (nm) 850 
 RMS Spectral Width (dB) 0.45 
 Optical Extinction Ratio (dB) 5.5 
Receiver Receiver Sensitivity (dBm) -11.1 
 RX Wavelength Range (nm) 840-860 
Fiber Link Link Length (m) 1 
 
Fiber diameter - core/cladding 
(nm/µm) 
62.5/125 
 Modal Bandwidth (MHz x km) 200 
 Attenuation (dB/km) 3 
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This is a clear advantage over other encryption mecha-
nisms whose inherent overhead limits the total throughput 
to values lower than 100% [16].  
7 ENCRYPTION RESULTS 
7.1 Encryption Properties 
The encrypted link has been tested with different Ethernet 
traffic flows. Thanks to the Ethernet frame generators four 
different traffic patterns have been encrypted. These have 
been named A, B, C and D. Pattern A corresponds with the 
case of no frame transmission, where only 64b/66b control 
blocks full of idle characters are transmitted over the link. 
Patterns B, C and D correspond to continuous frame trans-
mission of 1024-bytes length at rates of 10.2%, 50% and 
98% of the maximum 10 Gigabit line rate, respectively, and 
with random payloads.  
Two conclusions arise from simulation and hardware 
debugging. On the one hand, encryption and decryption 
work correctly and synchronously without harming data 
traffic or link establishment between 10G Ethernet inter-
faces. No CRC errors are produced when transmitting the 
mentioned traffic patterns. On the other hand encrypted 
traffic patterns are masked, which can improve the overall 
security against passive eavesdroppers. 
Regarding this capability, it is interesting to monitor 
signal waveforms after the encryption module, at the input 
of the scrambler. The 64b/66b data bus is formed by the 2-
bit sync header and the 64-bit block payload. If encryption 
is disabled, the synchronization header takes the value ‘10’ 
when frames are transmitted and ‘01’ during the IFG be-
tween frames.  In t-he case of pattern A, as no frames are 
transmitted, sync header is always equal to ‘01’. However 
when encryption is enabled, the sync header takes random 
values between ‘10’ and ‘01’. Also, the 64-bit block payload 
is randomized. In this way the traffic pattern is indistin-
guishable, independently of whether frames are being 
transmitted or not. In Fig. 10 waveforms of an encrypted 
pattern are shown. 
In order to check this masking property, the random-
ness test suite proposed by NIST [38] has been used to eval-
uate encrypted patterns. Also SE (Shannon Entropy) has 
been measured and compared among the mentioned non-
encrypted patterns and the encrypted signal. 
 Owing to the limited memory in FPGA hardware re-
sources, these tests have been performed at simulation 
stage, but this fact does not invalidate experimental results. 
 Regarding the NIST tests, sync header and block pay-
load have been evaluated separately with these tests con-
cluding that both can be considered random sequences af-
ter encrypting any of the mentioned patterns. As an exam-
ple, results for NIST test applied to the patterns D and C 
before and after encryption are shown in Fig. 11. It is pos-
sible to conclude that although they are very different pat-
terns, after encryption they are transformed into a se-
quence that passes these tests, which makes them indistin-
guishable from a random stream. 
As for SE measurement, it has also been calculated for 
  
       (a)              (b) 
       
       (c)             (d) 
 
Fig. 11.  NIST test results for the 64b/66b block payload of D pattern, (a) before encryption and (b) after it. NIST test results for the 64b/66b 
block payload of C pattern, (c) before encryption and (d) after it.  
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the mapped sync header and block payload separately as 
defined in (23). 
 
𝑆𝐸 = −
1
𝑛
∙ ∑ 𝑃(𝛽𝑛) ∙ log2 𝑃(𝛽𝑛)
𝛽𝑛𝜖2
𝑛
        (23) 
 
In both cases the bit stream has been grouped in tuples 
of n bits called 𝛽𝑛 and the probability for each tuple, 𝑃(𝛽𝑛), 
has been calculated. SE has been measured for values of n 
equal to 4, 8 and 12 bits in each of the mentioned non-en-
crypted patterns A, B, C and D, all of them with fixed 
length frame and random payloads. In addition two more 
patterns have been added: E and F. Pattern E corresponds 
to continuous frame transmission with random payloads 
and random length between 64 and 1516 bytes while pat-
tern F corresponds to the randomized signal after encryp-
tion of pattern A, which can be considered the worst case 
in terms of entropy. In Figs. 12 and 13 the comparison 
among the measured SE is shown. It is possible to notice 
that SE in pattern F is as expected, almost the ideal value 
of 1 in both cases, block payload and sync header, as it is 
encrypted. In the rest of non-encrypted patterns SE of 
block payloads decreases as the transmission rate de-
creases from E to A. This effect is owing to the ratio of the 
bandwidth that is used by the IFGs (Inter Frame Gaps). As 
when lower bandwidth is used, the IFGs full of idle sets 
takes more bandwidth percentage versus the random pay-
loads of the transmitted frames, resulting in a lower SE. In 
the case of sync header entropy, clearly all non-encrypted 
patterns achieve a very low value. 
Thank to this result it is possible to conclude that en-
cryption makes indistinguishable data traffic pattern, as 
the maximum value for SE is obtained and NIST tests are 
passed successfully when traffic is encrypted.  
 
7.2 Self-synchronization 
The SRD (Synchronization Recovery Delay) is the metric 
used to examine the resynchronization properties of SCFB 
and PSCFB modes [27]. It is defined as the expected number 
of bits following a sync loss before synchronization is 
reestablished. According to [30], upper and lower bounds 
for SRD depend on the block size L, number of pipelines P 
and size of the synchronization pattern n. Taking into ac-
count that in this system L=192 and P=58, upper and lower 
SRD bounds calculated with different values of n are 
shown in Fig. 14. As for n below 11 the upper bound grows, 
those values have not been shown. In this work n=12 has 
been used, limiting the upper bound of SRD to 304 en-
crypted 64b/66b blocks. 
Experimental results and simulation show that self-
synchronization works correctly. By removing the optical 
fiber with encryption activated between Ethernet inter-
faces, both link status and encryption synchronization are 
lost. However, when restoring the optical fiber encryption 
synchronization is always recovered after PCS link status 
is achieved. Traffic bursts were correctly tested after syn-
chronization recovering to check the integrity of the link. 
 
Fig. 12. Shannon Entropy of block payloads measured with n equal 
to 4, 8 and 12 in Ethernet traffic patterns from A to F.  
 
Fig. 14. Theoretical maximum and minimum SRD values for different 
sync pattern sizes. 
 
Fig. 13. Shannon Entropy of mapped sync header measured with n 
equal to 4, 8 and 12 in Ethernet traffic patterns from A to F. In the 
case of A pattern, sync header has a continuous value, which means 
that its entropy is zero. Because of this, A bar is zero in this figure.  
. 
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8 OTHER SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS 
Although in this paper physical layer encryption mech-
anism is proposed and developed, other security consider-
ations must be taken into account, especially regarding the 
key configuration and refreshing. One possible solution 
could be the use of classical public key encryption 
schemes, where the interchange of the symmetric master 
key is performed thanks to algorithms such as RSA used 
by protocols at higher communication layers. As an exam-
ple, in the layer 2 encryption protocol MACsec, the master 
key negotiation is outside of its specification and is carried 
out by IEEE 802.1X standard. Therefore, the same idea 
could be considered for this work. 
Other possible solutions for key distribution are optical 
mechanisms such as QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) 
that is based on the laws of physics rather than classic 
asymmetric cryptography algorithms. In spite of the cross-
talk that classical signals can introduce to QKD channels, 
successful experiments where QKD channels coexist with 
classical data traffic are a reality [39], [40]. Thanks to WDM 
(Wavelength-Division-Multiplexing) techniques it is possi-
ble to reduce the crosstalk noise to a tolerable level, which 
means that QKD could also be considered for its use with 
the encryption mechanism presented in this work. 
9 CONCLUSION 
To the authors best knowledge, this is the first time that 
a self-synchronous encryption method is proposed for 
ciphering physical layer communications based on 
64b/66b encoding. The new encryption system consists 
of a self-synchronous symmetric ciphering of the com-
plete 64b/66b block stream. The encryption is based on 
the PSCFB mode, and it has been simulated and imple-
mented over an FPGA. Also security considerations for 
this mode have been taken into account, deriving a for-
mal security expression similar to that known for other 
operation modes. 
This new mechanism is able to perform encryption 
at a line-rate introducing a latency in the range of nano-
seconds, while the complete data traffic pattern is 
masked, improving the overall security. 
Although this mechanism is proposed for 10Gbps 
Ethernet links, 64b/66b encoding is used in other stand-
ards at higher rates, as 100 Gigabit Ethernet. It means 
that the same encryption scheme could be applied not 
only to the access networks but also to long-haul optical 
links in transport networks. 
In addition to this, by preserving coding properties 
such as short run length and transition density, physical 
layer encryption is achieved without making changes in 
the subsequent circuitry. For example, commercial 
SFP+ modules or SERDES at 10 Gbps rate are compati-
ble with the proposed encryption scheme. 
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